Umbrella coalition of Sahelian jihadist factions, formally aligned with al-Qaeda. Brought together AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, and al-Mourabitoun under a unified command structure in March 2017. Led by Iyad Ag Ghaly (Tuareg, former Ansar Dine commander), with Amadou Kouffa (Macina Liberation Front) as deputy. Kouffa was reported killed in 2023; his operational status remains uncertain as of mid-2026.
- Northern and central Mali, primary operational base; proto-governance in Kidal, Timbuktu, Mopti regions
- Northern Burkina Faso, Sahel and Nord regions, including Djibo district
- Western Niger, Tillaberi and Tahoua regions, Agadez first recorded attack October 2025
- Northern Benin, Alibori and Atacora departments, cross-border from Burkina and Niger
- Northern Togo, Savanes region, growing operational presence since 2022
- Armed drone programme: fewer than 10 strikes in 2024, approximately 80 in 2025, fastest drone escalation of any non-state actor in Africa
- Economic warfare: blockade of Bamako supply routes since September 2025; convoy attacks, fuel truck arson, market taxation
- VBIED operations: April 2026 Kati attack killed Mali's Defence Minister General Sadio Camara
- Governance: justice provision, taxation, and recruitment embedded in local social networks across controlled zones
- Highway landmine campaign on all major routes into Bamako
JNIM has crossed a strategic threshold in 2026. The April offensive demonstrated the capacity to coordinate simultaneous military, assassination, and urban disruption operations. The Bamako economic blockade is not a peripheral activity, it is the central strategic instrument, designed to erode state legitimacy and demonstrate that the government cannot protect commerce. The drone escalation from fewer than 10 to approximately 80 strikes in twelve months represents the most significant capability development of any non-state actor in sub-Saharan Africa and will require a qualitatively different counter-response. Coastal spillover into Benin, Togo, and the Cote d'Ivoire border zone is no longer speculative. JIDELFA assesses continued escalation through Q3–Q4 2026 as the high-probability trajectory.
Formally designated as Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) in 2022, succeeding the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) designation. Affiliated with Islamic State central, placing it in structural antagonism with JNIM's al-Qaeda affiliation. The global JNIM-ISIS rivalry plays out operationally across the Sahel tri-border zone. Leadership identities are not publicly confirmed as of mid-2026.
- Tri-border zone of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, primary operational base
- Northern Burkina Faso, escalating attacks through 2025 into 2026
- Niger, Tillaberi, Tahoua, and Diffa regions; Niamey urban periphery
- Nigeria, growing Lake Chad Basin presence, cooperation with ISWAP contested
- Increasingly sophisticated weaponry including anti-armour capabilities
- Complex multi-stage attacks on military installations
- Urban operations: Niamey airport struck January 2026
- Inter-factional violence with JNIM generates unpredictable civilian casualties
- Exploitation of governance vacuums left by state retreat from northern zones
ISSP is pursuing an urban escalation strategy in 2026, targeting hardened positions to demonstrate reach rather than to hold territory. The January Niamey airport strike, followed six months later by JNIM's strike on the same target, reflects a competitive dynamic in which both groups use high-visibility attacks to signal capability and recruit. ACLED analyst Heni Nsaibia's framing is accurate: JNIM was in June 2026 marking territory directed simultaneously at the Niger junta and at ISSP. This inter-factional competition does not reduce the threat; it amplifies it, as each group escalates to outperform the other.
Formally affiliated with Islamic State central following its 2016 split from Boko Haram over targeting of Muslim civilians. Abu-Bilal al-Minuki served as global ISIS second-in-command and ISWAP operational coordinator until killed on 16 May 2026 by a US-Nigeria joint operation in Sokoto State. Al-Minuki had links to the 2014 Dapchi schoolgirl kidnapping. Zone commanders hold significant operational autonomy, which limits the impact of leadership decapitation on overall capacity.
- Lake Chad Basin, core operational zone across Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon
- Northeastern Nigeria, Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states
- Lake Chad islands, contested governance with Boko Haram faction
- Northwestern Cameroon, cross-border operations from Nigerian base
- Sokoto State, presence confirmed by May 2026 AFRICOM-Nigeria operation
- Military convoy attacks with evolving anti-armour capacity
- Governance in captured Lake Chad zones including taxation and justice provision
- Abductions including schoolgirl kidnappings as a signature tactic
- Decentralised zone command structure limiting the strategic effect of leadership losses
- Cross-border operational reach demonstrated by Sokoto State attack
The May 2026 AFRICOM-Nigeria operation was the most consequential counterterrorism strike in West Africa in years and is correctly assessed as a significant tactical success. It was also the diagnostic moment this programme has documented extensively: ECOWAS was absent. ISWAP's decentralised command structure means the symbolic value of al-Minuki's death exceeds its operational impact. The 2025 attack escalation from 20 to 92 incidents in Nigeria reflects structural growth rather than a leadership-driven surge, and that structural growth is unaffected by the May operation. JIDELFA assesses ISWAP at stable-high threat through 2026 with elevated risk of retaliatory escalation in Borno State.
The residual Boko Haram faction following the 2016 ISWAP split operates under the Bakura leadership structure. Abubakar Shekau, the group's founding and defining commander, died in June 2021. The faction retains some capacity but faces sustained pressure from ISWAP, which has absorbed significant portions of its fighter base, and from Nigerian and multinational military operations.
The Bakura faction no longer constitutes an independent strategic threat of the first order. Its operational significance is primarily as a complicating variable for ISWAP, inter-factional violence creates unpredictable civilian casualties and occasionally tactical opportunities for state security forces. The group is assessed as declining but not eliminated, and retains the capacity for targeted abductions and localised attacks in its Lake Chad strongholds.
Africa Corps personnel are embedded across AES states not merely as trainers or advisers but as operational combatants and palace guards for junta leadership. This deployment model creates structural dependency and makes any reversal of the Russia-AES relationship politically and physically hazardous for junta leaders. Russia extracts access to mineral resources including gold, uranium, and lithium in exchange for security guarantees and diplomatic cover.
Africa Corps has demonstrated that external security guarantors can provide tactical support and political protection for junta governments but cannot substitute for indigenous, legitimate regional security architecture. The loss of Kidal, Wagner's single most publicised military achievement, inverted the narrative of Russian efficacy that had sustained AES governments' domestic legitimacy. JIDELFA notes the cautionary lesson for ECOWAS planning: external actors operating without political legitimacy and population-centric doctrine do not degrade jihadist capacity at the operational level. Russia's interest in perpetuating instability that justifies its continued presence is a structural feature of the relationship, not an incidental concern.
The FLA and its parent framework the CMA represent Tuareg and Arab armed factions seeking autonomy or independence for the Azawad region in northern Mali. The 2015 Algiers Peace Accord provided a framework for disarmament and political integration that the Goita junta effectively abandoned. Wagner's capture of Kidal in November 2023 displaced CMA forces and provoked the April 2026 counter-offensive. FLA President Bilal Ag Acherif declared full control of Kidal following the April 25 operation.
The April 2026 joint offensive marks the most significant operational alignment between the FLA and JNIM on record. The alliance is tactical rather than ideological, both groups share a common enemy in the Mali junta and Africa Corps. The long-term durability of this alignment is uncertain; Tuareg secular nationalism and JNIM's jihadist project have historically been in tension, but the 2026 junta offensive has provided a temporary common purpose.
The FLA-JNIM tactical coalition is the most consequential development in Mali's conflict landscape since the 2012 offensive. Its durability will determine whether northern Mali stabilises around a de facto partition or becomes a permanent contested zone. JIDELFA notes that the Algiers Accord, however imperfect, represented the only internationally recognised framework for managing Tuareg political grievances through non-violent means. Its effective abandonment by the Goita junta removed the political alternative and made military resurgence rational. Any durable settlement in northern Mali must eventually address the underlying grievances the Accord was designed to manage.
All profiles draw exclusively on publicly available, verifiable sources: ACLED conflict data, UN Security Council Reports, US Congressional Research Service assessments, the IEP Global Terrorism Index, Crisis Group analysis, Africa Center for Strategic Studies reporting, and named journalistic sources including PBS NewsHour, CNN, Al Jazeera, and Jeune Afrique. Threat levels and trend assessments reflect JIDELFA International's analytical judgement and are updated when significant operational developments warrant revision. Last comprehensive update: July 2026.
Threat-actor analysis without a prevention-and-response counterpart is only half the picture. This section catalogues, across seven West African states, the presence, and increasingly the absence, of the community-level, grassroots P/CVE programming, the regional prevention and security architecture, and the enabling environment for civil society on which any durable stabilisation depends. The findings are uneven across the seven states and, in the AES-3, starkly regressive: Burkina Faso is closing the enabling environment for civil society in real time; the G5 Sahel has dissolved; the Accra Initiative is operationally dormant; and no operational off-ramp (the defector, amnesty, and DDR frameworks that P/CVE literature identifies as structurally essential to sustainable stabilisation) exists anywhere in the region. Where cells appear blank, the underlying data was not verified in this cycle rather than confirmed absent; those cells will be revisited at the Q4 2026 refresh.
| Indicator | Mali | Burkina Faso | Niger | Benin | Togo | Ghana | Côte d'Ivoire |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Community-level P/CVEPresence of Interpeace, SFCG, GCERF grantees, national P/CVE centres | ActiveInterpeace (Sikasso cross-border); GCERF portfolio US$10.1M since 2016; SFCG country programme.123 | ActiveInterpeace (Hauts-Bassins); GCERF US$7M, 21 CSO grantees, national P/CVE plan 2026 to 2030; SFCG active.143 | LimitedGCERF Sahel portfolio active. Interpeace and SFCG presence not verified this cycle.2 | LimitedSFCG country programme; GCERF presence not documented in Benin.3 | LimitedSFCG country programme; GCERF presence not documented.3 | ActiveGCERF active; KAIPTC hosts regional P/CVE training and research; SFCG active.253 | LimitedSFCG country programme. Northern Comöe, Zanzan increasingly the P/CVE frontline; formal programme mapping incomplete.3 |
| Civic space & CSO environmentNGO dissolution, INGO expulsion, media freedom, political space | ConstrainedJunta rule since 2021. Growing restrictions on independent media and arbitrary detention of activists. Former PM Moussa Mara sentenced Feb 2026 to two years for a social-media post.67 | Collapse15 April 2026: 118 NGOs dissolved by decree; 350+ suspended days later. aggregate 929 CSOs suspended between April and May 2026. between June and July 2025 approximately 20 foreign organisations were delicensed (Sant'Egidio, Diakonia, Geneva Call, Tony Blair Institute). All political parties dissolved 29 Jan 2026. UN OHCHR permanently closing Ouagadougou office (30 Jun 2026).891011 | ConstrainedJunta rule since July 2023. Restrictions on political parties and media. December 2025 "general mobilisation" grants sweeping powers to requisition civilians and resources.7 | N/V20 | N/V20 | OpenRobust civic space, active civil society. Regional outlier.21 | N/V20 |
| Multilateral programme presenceUNDP RSF, GCERF, EU STRIVE, bilateral CT partners | ActiveUNDP Liptako-Gourma Stabilisation Facility since 2021 (Bandiagara flagship); EU/STRIVE-GCERF through 2028; Turkey drone assistance. US CT withdrawn since 2020.121314 | ActiveUNDP Liptako-Gourma facility; GCERF portfolio; EU/STRIVE grants; Turkey drones. France expelled 2023; US CT withdrawn since 2022.12413 | ActiveUNDP Liptako-Gourma; UNDP Lake Chad Basin RSF (2019 to 2028 phase, US$228M cumulative); GCERF; Turkey drones. US Air Base 201 Agadez withdrawn Aug 2024.12152 | LimitedBilateral partnerships post-French withdrawal (UAE, Morocco). Modest EU / bilateral P/CVE spend in northern departments.1416 | LimitedPost-French bilateral partnerships (UAE, Morocco). Northern regions the focus.1416 | ActiveGCERF; KAIPTC regional hub; EU/STRIVE partner; US CT partner.2513 | LimitedBilateral partnerships continue. Accra Initiative member. EU engagement in northern regions.14 |
| Defector, amnesty, DDR schemesOff-ramps for combatants; reintegration; low-level amnesty | None activePrior Algiers Accord (2015) DDR provisions effectively abandoned by junta from 2022.17 | InverseNo formal DDR. Volunteers for Defence of the Homeland (VDP) is the inverse: civilian militarisation, 50,000+ volunteers by 2024, implicated in atrocities against Fulani communities.18 | CollapsedTentative 2016 to 2020 amnesty framework for low-level defectors substantively collapsed after July 2023 coup.22 | Not documented | Not documented | Preventive onlyNo post-conflict DDR needed to date. Preventive framework via National Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre (NACTFC).5 | Legacy closed2011 post-election crisis DDR framework closed. No active framework for violent extremism.19 |
| Education & youth resilienceSchools closed, teachers displaced, children out of school | Severe~1,600+ schools closed (2024 UNICEF regional data, updated 2025); pre-existing ~1M children out of school.2324 | Peak crisis1M+ children out of school; 31,000+ teachers displaced or unable to work. 230 schools serving as IDP shelters. Boucle du Mouhoun, Est, Sahel, Centre-Nord regions worst.25 | Severe1,084 schools not functioning (Nov 2025), 80,000+ children affected, ~half girls. 2024 floods damaged 5,520 classrooms; 1,969 used as IDP shelters.26 | N/V20 | N/V20 | N/V20 | N/V20 |
| Sahel core aggregateMali + BF + Niger combined | Regional totals14,800 schools closed across the Sahel core by mid-2025; 3 million children deprived of education.27 Aggregate is dominated by Burkina Faso (~60%), followed by Mali (~25%) and Niger (~15%) by school-closure count. | ||||||
Dissolution followed AES formation and Mali/BF/Niger withdrawal. No successor mechanism inherited the G5's cross-border remit.
Last major joint operation Koudalgou IV, 2021. UNDP-KAIPTC support project closed May 2024. Secretariat in Accra remains staffed; operational output minimal. AES-3 members effectively absent given ECOWAS rupture.5
Standing counter-Boko Haram / counter-ISWAP force. Operationally continuous. Only regional mechanism with an unbroken activity record over the last decade.
Launched December 2025 at 5,000 personnel; expanded to 15,000 mid-April 2026. Joint air campaign confirmed following the 25 April 2026 attacks in Mali. Operational effectiveness untested at scale; command architecture opaque.28
Initial 2,000 personnel targeted for CT deployment by end-2026. Financial and political constraints acknowledged. First time the ESF would be deployed against ideological armed groups rather than political rebels.29
- Interpeace, Mali country page and Brick by brick cross-border initiative, 2025 to 2026.
- GCERF, country pages for Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Ghana; donors and partners page, 2025 to 2026.
- Search for Common Ground, country and initiative pages.
- GCERF, Burkina Faso country page (June 2026).
- KAIPTC / UNDP Accra Initiative project closure (May 2024); NACTFC public documentation.
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Mali country page (March 2026).
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Central Sahel country pages (March 2026).
- Human Rights Watch, "Burkina Faso: Crackdown on Civil Society" (20 April 2026).
- Amnesty International, "Burkina Faso: Dissolution of NGOs" (16 April 2026).
- Al Jazeera, "Burkina Faso dissolves more than 100 NGOs" (17 April 2026); FIDH (22 April 2026).
- UN OHCHR announcement, 30 June 2026; ACAPS Burkina Faso country page.
- UNDP, Regional Stabilization Facility for the Lake Chad Basin and Liptako-Gourma Regions (2024 phase documentation, current cycle September 2024 to August 2028).
- European Union Global Threats programme, STRIVE-GCERF factsheet (June 2025).
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Recalibrating Coastal West Africa's Response to Violent Extremism" (July 2024).
- UNDP Regional Stabilization Facility (RSF) programme report (2026).
- ModernGhana, "From Burkina to Accra" (11 June 2026).
- International Crisis Group, Mali analysis (April 2026).
- Human Rights Watch reporting on the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), various dates.
- Consensus across ICG and Africa Center for Strategic Studies reporting.
- Not verified this cycle. Blank cell will be revisited at Q4 2026 refresh.
- General consensus across reviewed sources; specific press-freedom and civic-space index ranks not verified this cycle.
- Consensus across reviewed sources; formal announcement of the framework's collapse not documented in public reporting reviewed this cycle.
- UNICEF, Regional Study on Education System Resilience in the Sahel (2025).
- UNRIC, Central Sahel briefing (June 2026).
- UNICEF Burkina Faso press release (October 2024); UNICEF West and Central Africa child alert.
- Central Sahel's Education Crisis: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, EiE Hub brief (January 2026), citing UNICEF Niger November 2025 figures.
- UNRIC / UNHCR / UNICEF aggregate (mid-2025); reproduced in UNRIC Central Sahel briefing (June 2026).
- AfricaNews, "Alliance of Sahel States confirms joint airstrikes in Mali" (1 May 2026).
- Al Jazeera, "West African regional army" (2 March 2026).
The composite reading across the six indicators is that the P/CVE architecture the Sahel needs is being dismantled in the same countries, and at the same pace, as the security threat it exists to counter is escalating. Burkina Faso is the sharpest case: a state that would, on any reasonable analytical projection, require the maximum tolerable density of preventive programming has, in the last twelve months, systematically closed the very enabling environment on which such programming depends. The three AES states share a common regressive trajectory; the four coastal states share a common constrained-but-functional posture with Ghana as the regional outlier. Across all seven, the absence of any operational off-ramp architecture removes the essential structural complement to security pressure that P/CVE literature identifies as a prerequisite for durable stabilisation. On present indicators the trajectory is not reversing, and the governance conditions that would permit reversal are contracting rather than expanding. Absorbing the security cost of a dismantled prevention architecture is a policy choice, not an inevitability; the costs of that choice will accrue disproportionately to the populations the architecture was built to protect.