On 25 April 2026, JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front launched the largest coordinated offensive in Mali since 2012. Kidal fell to rebel forces; Africa Corps withdrew from Kidal, Aguelhok and Tessalit. Defence Minister General Sadio Camara was killed by a vehicle-borne IED at his Kati residence. The intelligence chief was wounded in a separate attack. On 4 July, JNIM-FLA forces resumed coordinated attacks at Anefis and Kenio, opening a second phase of the offensive.

The Bamako economic blockade, in operation since September 2025, has disrupted fuel and food supply corridors. On 6 May JNIM set fire to a convoy of Moroccan freight trucks on the Bougouni-Bamako route. On 1 June a bus on the Bamako-Kayes highway was struck by a landmine, killing 8 and injuring 42.

Source: ACLED / Malijet / UN Security Council Report July 2026

On 18 June 2026, JNIM struck Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, killing 11 soldiers and 2 civilians and losing 22 of its own fighters. It was the second attack on the airport in six months, following an ISSP strike in January. The airport also hosts the AES regional alliance headquarters, air force base, and drone fleet. ACLED West Africa analyst Heni Nsaibia described the attack as JNIM marking territory, a message directed simultaneously at the junta and its rival the Islamic State.

JNIM recorded its first attack in the Agadez region in October 2025 and has sustained operations in the Tillaberi region and along the Dosso-Benin-Nigeria borderlands throughout 2026.

Source: ACLED / PBS NewsHour 18 June 2026 / Security Council Report July 2026

In June 2026, Burkina Faso severed diplomatic ties with France, accusing Paris of harbouring neo-colonial ambitions and actively supporting subversive networks. France rejected the characterisation as hostile and unfounded. The break removes the last significant Western security partner from the AES bloc. More than half of Burkina Faso's territory remains outside effective government control as of mid-2026.

In May 2025, JNIM briefly seized the provincial capitals of Djibo and Diapaga in rapid succession. In August 2024, the Barsalogho massacre killed at least 130 civilians and wounded 200 more. ACLED records the VDP self-defence militia as increasingly unable to hold territory, limiting the state's capacity to reclaim contested zones.

Source: ACLED Economic Warfare Report Dec 2025 / CFR Conflict Tracker May 2026

JNIM is now the world's second deadliest terrorist group according to the Institute for Economics and Peace, responsible for more than 1,200 deaths across four countries in 2025. Between its formation in 2017 and end of 2025, JNIM was involved in 16,023 violent incidents resulting in an estimated 39,850 deaths across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin and Togo (Crisis Group / ACLED).

JNIM's use of armed drones escalated from fewer than 10 recorded strikes in 2024 to approximately 80 in 2025. Violent events involving jihadist groups in the Benin-Niger-Nigeria borderlands increased by roughly 86 percent between 2024 and 2025, while related fatalities surged by over 260 percent (HSToday / ACLED).

Source: IEP Global Terrorism Index 2026 / ACLED May 2026 / Crisis Group ICG April 2026

Between 8 and 14 September, Houthi forces captured the Red Sea port of Mokha and the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands, extending their hold on the approaches to the Bab al-Mandeb strait. A Saudi-backed government counter-offensive, supported by more than 300 coalition airstrikes over five days, repelled a Houthi push in western Taiz on 13 September.

The World Health Organization recorded 728 people killed or wounded since 23 August, concentrated in Taiz and the western coast. Displacement from Taiz governorate alone reached 65,845 people between 10 August and 15 September, part of more than 100,000 displaced nationwide by the Houthi coastal offensive.

Source: Al Jazeera (8, 10, 14, 16 Sept 2026) / World Health Organization

On 3 September, coordinated Houthi missile and drone strikes hit Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, wounding 73 people and igniting fires at the Jazan Aramco refinery. The Houthis struck King Khalid Airbase at Khamis Mushait again on 14 September, and further strikes wounded 13 civilians on 15 September, prompting coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki to vow a “firm” response.

A damaged east-west oil pipeline forced Saudi Arabia to suspend loadings at the Yanbu Red Sea terminal from 11 September and cancel late-month cargoes to Europe, pushing Brent crude to its highest level in four months.

Source: NPR (8 Sept 2026) / Al Jazeera (15, 16 Sept 2026) / GlobalSecurity.org (16 Sept 2026)

The Houthi-Saudi escalation is unfolding against the backdrop of the 2026 Iran war, which began 28 February when US and Israeli strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. As of 16 September, Iran had not struck a host-nation base for seven consecutive days, its longest pause since fighting resumed on 28 August, though it struck Jordan's Muwaffaq Salti airbase with 20 missiles on 8–9 September and the US destroyed two IRGC boats on 14 September.

Strait of Hormuz shipping remains severely disrupted, with independent monitors recording as few as four to six commodity vessels transiting daily against a pre-war baseline above 100. JIDELFA assesses the Houthi front as Iran's principal means of sustaining regional pressure while avoiding further direct exposure.

Source: NPR (28 Feb 2026) / GlobalSecurity.org (16 Sept 2026) / CFR Global Conflict Tracker

73 wounded in the 3 September strikes on four Saudi cities. 13 more wounded on 15 September. 728 killed or wounded in Yemen since 23 August (WHO). Over 100,000 displaced by the Houthi coastal offensive; 65,845 from Taiz alone. Hormuz transits down to roughly 4–6 vessels a day from a 100+ baseline.

No ceasefire or peace track is active on either the Yemen-Saudi or the US/Israel-Iran track as of 16 September 2026.

Source: World Health Organization / Al Jazeera / GlobalSecurity.org